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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960064-CA 
v. : 
MICHAEL MORRISON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
i^RIgDICTIQN AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), and possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
convicted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (1995), in the Seqond Judicial District 
Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Stanton M. Taylor, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to 
review this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) 
(Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
conditionally admitting highly probative evidence? "When 
reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of 
evidence under rules 4 03 and 4 04, [Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
reviewing] court will sustain the trial court's ruling unless it 
constitutes and abuse of discretion. State v. Ramirez, 299 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Utah App. 1996). ME]ven if the court erred in 
admitting the challenged evidence, * [the appellate court] will 
only reverse if the error was harmful, "i.e., if absent the error 
there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to 
the defendant.'"" Id. (citing State v. White. 880 P.2d 18, 21 
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 
(Utah 1993)) . 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to 
grant defendant's motion for a mistrial where the court instead 
gave a curative instruction in a case of overwhelming evidence? 
%XA trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a 
mistrial and its decision will remain undisturbed absent an abuse 
of that discretion." State v. Price. 909 P.2d 256, 262 (Utah 
App. 1995), cert, denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (citations 
omitted). 
3. Was the prosecutor's comment on defendant's post-arrest 
silence prejudicial, considering all the evidence, and did his 
cross examination of a hostile, responsive witness constitute a 
denial of defendant's right to confrontation? These issues were 
not presented to the trial court and are presented to this Court 
for de novo review under the plain error doctrine. State v. 
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative portions of the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes and rules are set out in Addendum A: 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995); 
Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence; and 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Michael Morrison, was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996) (Count 
I), enhanced by being a habitual criminal, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 1994), and possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a convicted person, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1) (1995) (Count II) (R. 1-3).x 
Prior to trial, the court partially granted defendant's motion in 
limine, allowing initials written on the casing of a bullet 
loaded in a gun found in defendant's home, but excluding evidence 
that the initials were those of defendant's former probation 
officer (R. 77, 393-402). Following a jury trial, defendant was 
convicted of the lesser included offense of Count I, possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and of Count II 
(R. 3 03). The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive 
zero-to-five year terms (R. 303-04). On the State's motion 
1
 The information correctly sets out the charge in the 
language of section 76-10-503(1), to wit: defendant had 
previously been convicted of a crime of violence, a third degree 
felony. However, the information incorrectly identifies the 
offense as a violation of subsection 2, a second degree felony. 
The charge was correctly submitted to the jury pursuant to 
subsection (1) (R. 350). 
3 
following the sentencing, the court dismissed the habitual 
criminal penalty enhancement (R. 390). 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
On the morning of January 17, 1995, Layton City Police 
Officer Robert Price and Detective Alan Swanson went to 
defendant's residence in Roy, Utah, to serve an arrest warrant on 
charges unrelated to the instant case (R. 492-93, 501-02, 530). 
Defendant's mother, Lavonda Robins, answered the door and 
directed the officers to defendant's bedroom, located in the 
basement (R. 494, 503, 513, 531). Upon identifying themselves 
and then entering, both officers saw a woman, Jill Crittenden,2 
and defendant in bed together. Crittenden immediately grabbed a 
syringe, reached over defendant and put the syringe in a dresser 
drawer next to defendant (R. 494-95, 503-04). Defendant and 
Crittenden were arrested and given Miranda warnings (R. 504).3 
Defendant said that he understood his rights and that he was 
willing to speak to the officers (R. 505). Defendant said that 
he did not know of any drugs in the room, even though Crittenden 
had just grabbed a syringe and two or three more were in plain 
sight on the night stand next to Crittenden's side of the bed (R. 
2
 The names "Crittenden" and "Teeter" are used 
interchangeably throughout the trial. "Teeter" is Crittenden's 
maiden name (R. 632). 
3
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 463, 886 S. Ct. 1602 
(1966) . 
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505-06) . However, defendant admitted that he and Crittenden had 
shot up a little methamphetamine and used a little marijuana the 
night before (R. 509). Because drug matters were not within 
their special province, Detective Swanson called the Weber-Morgan 
County Strike Force for assistance (R. 510). 
Also, concerned about their safety, the officers looked 
around the room and saw a box of .357 Magnum rounds on top of a 
dresser and a single .380 round on top of a speaker (R. 495-96, 
507-08). When asked if there was a gun in the room, defendant 
hesitated and then answered, "No" (R. 508). When asked about the 
bullets, defendant first said there might be a gun in the room, 
but that he did not know where it was (R. 508-09). Eventually, 
defendant said that, although he was not sure, it might be in one 
of the dresser drawers, to which he directed the officers' 
attention (R. 510). Checking a drawer, Officer Swanson found a 
loaded .357 revolver, along with some small plastic baggies, a 
container of inositol and a smoking pipe (R. 510-12). 
Lieutenant Chris Zimmerman of the Ogden City Police 
Department, Commander of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike 
Force,4 dispatched Roy City Police Officer Michael Elliott to 
defendant's residence and then proceeded to defendant's residence 
himself (R. 528-30, 574-75, 581). Coincidentally, Lieutenant 
4
 At the time of the events at issue Lieutenant 
Zimmerman was a sergeant and the field supervisor of the Strike 
Force (R. 575). 
5 
Zimmerman had obtained a search warrant for defendant's premises, 
which he had intended to serve later that day. The warrant was 
based on background intelligence and controlled "buys" from 
Crittenden, known to be living with defendant and followed to 
defendant's residence during the buys (R. 579-80) .5 
Pursuant to the warrant, Lieutenant Zimmerman and Officer 
Elliott searched defendant's room (R. 530-31). Examining the 
.357 revolver, Officer Elliot found it loaded and ready to fire 
with three regular bullets and two miniature buckshot cartridges 
(R. 533). Lieutenant Zimmerman discovered that one of the 
buckshot cartridges had the name "K. Allen" written on it (R. 
583). Officer Elliott also confirmed the discovery of a couple 
of baggies, the container of inositol and a pipe in the same 
drawer (R. 536-37). Learning in the course of the search that 
defendant was a restricted person, Officer Elliott also took the 
following items from the same drawer: (1) a prescription bottle 
for folic acid bearing defendant's name; (2) a Blockbuster video 
card with defendant's name on it; (3) a blue paper containing a 
substantial list of telephone numbers; (4) a work order for 
defendant's black Thunderbird; (5) a small calculator; and (6) a 
5
 Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from the 
defendant's premises pursuant to the warrant, on the ground that 
the supporting affidavit, drafted by Lieutenant Zimmerman, lacked 
probable cause and because officers could not have relied upon 
the warrant in good faith (Motion to Suppress, R. 50-51). 
Following a hearing, the motion was denied (R. 69). 
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letter dated December 2, 1993 from the Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation addressed to defendant (R. 546-48). 
Continuing their search, the officers found the rest of the 
room littered with drug paraphernalia and a small amount of 
drugs. In the same dresser, they found three small sets of 
scales, one of which contained a white powdery substance and the 
other a little residue (R. 545, 588-89). A large set of triple 
beam scales was also found in the dresser (R. 548). 
In a toolbox containing tools engraved with defendant's 
initials, Officer Elliott found a ziplock baggie containing other 
such baggies (535-36, 583-84). 
In a fanny pack they found a black comb such as a man might 
use, a case containing four or five Valium, a film canister with 
.? white powdery substance, some small, clean ziplocked baggies, a 
couple of lighters, and a small velvet bag containing a spoon 
that appeared to contain methamphetamine residue, a Brillo pad, 
some Q-tips, and a glass test tube in which there was a white 
powdery substance which had been burned (R. 538-40, 587) . 
In what appeared to be a woman's jacket hanging on the end 
of the bed, Lieutenant Zimmerman found two or three clean baggies 
and a knife inscribed with the name "Jill" (R. 541-42, 588) . 
On the nightstand from which Crittenden had grabbed the 
syringe half full of a brown liquid, the officers also found 
another spoon and Q-tip and more small baggies, three electronic 
7 
organizers, two address books, two of which bore the name 
"Michael" and a memo notebook (R. 541-44). In the nightstand 
they found a Sega Game Gear cartridge containing what appeared to 
be four to five grams of marijuana and about three grams of 
methamphetamine (R. 545-46). David Murdock, chemist at the Utah 
State Crime Laboratory, confirmed that one of the substances was 
methamphetamine, which appeared to have been clandestinely 
produced (R. 625-31). 
Both officers testified that certain items seized were 
evidence of intent to distribute: inositol, used as a cutting 
agent for methamphetamine to increase its quantity (R. 537, 560, 
586, 591), electronic organizers and address books for the names 
of buyers (R. 542-43, 564, 598-99), scales (R. 561, 588-89), and 
clean baggies (R. 568-69, 585, 591, 593). Taking the evidence as 
a whole, Lieutenant Zimmerman believed the methamphetamine seized 
was intended for sale (R. 599) , though on cross examination both 
he and Officer Elliott acknowledged that some of the evidence 
also indicated possession for use (R. 555-59, 568, 603-05). 
Defendant also elicited some testimony suggesting that evidence 
of distribution was attributable to Crittenden and not to 
defendant.6 
6
 Particularly, defendant elicited that the knife with 
the baggies was inscribed with the name "Jill," and that it came 
from what appeared to be a woman's coat (R. 557); the fanny pack 
was too small for defendant (R. 558-59); the address books could 
have been Crittenden's (R. 564); and the controlled buys were 
8 
In further support of the drug charge, Zimmerman testified 
that when he interviewed Crittenden following a subsequent drug 
bust in April, 1995, some three months after the events of this 
case, she stated that, with respect to drugs in this case, 
defendant was selling drugs and that she was delivering for him 
(R. 559-600, 639, 759-61). 
Called by the prosecution, Crittenden admitted that in 
connection with this criminal episode, for which she was 
ultimately convicted of possession and distribution of controlled 
substances, she had also negotiated with undercover agents for 
the sale of drugs and a firearm that belonged to defendant (R. 
633-34) . That negotiation was confirmed by Michelle Hernandez, a 
reserve officer with the Ogden City Police Department, working 
undercover on the controlled buys from Crittenden in this case 
(R. 740-43) . Crittenden said she got the bullets for the gun 
from a Johnny Morrell and took them to defendant's home, but that 
she never loaded them into the .357 revolver nor knew how they 
got into the gun (R. 635-36). 
Kim Allen, District Supervisor for Adult Probation and 
Parole ("AP&P), testified, without objection, that he had known 
defendant for about fifteen years and that he also knew 
Crittenden, though he had not dealt with her professionally (R. 
both made with Crittenden and not defendant (R. 601-02, 606). 
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660-61). On January 19, 1995, two days after defendant's arrest, 
Allen visited defendant in jail (R. 661). In their conversation, 
defendant claimed that he was not responsible for writing Allen's 
name on the .357 cartridge. Defendant claimed that someone else 
had written Allen's name on the .380 cartridge, and he believed 
that the Strike Force was lying (R. 663-64, 668, 746-47). 
Defendant also admitted that he and Crittenden had "fallen off 
the wagon," but denied that either Crittenden or he were dealing 
drugs (R. 664-65). 
In attempting to explain why defendant might have been angry 
at him, Allen testified that on a previous occasion he assisted 
the Strike Force on a search of defendant's house which resulted 
in the recovery of some stolen snow blowers (R. 683). Defendant 
moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion and gave 
the jury a curative instruction (R. 683-89). Thereafter, on 
rebuttal, Allen testified, again without objection, that 
defendant admitted that he had been a collection agent for drug 
dealers in the past and that he had not used a firearm in making 
his collection rounds, but rather needed only to raise his voice 
because "his reputation [for being assaultive] preceded him" (R. 
747) . 
In support of the habitual criminal and possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a convicted persons charges ("felon in 
possession"), the prosecution presented evidence that defendant 
10 
had been convicted and committed to prison on a second degree 
felony forgery and four third degree felonies, to wit: attempted 
forgery, burglary, possession of a controlled substance, and 
assault by a prisoner (R. 519-26, 573, 657-59). The court also 
instructed the jury that burglary and assault by a prisoner are 
crimes of violence (Jury Instruction #24, R. 351). 
Defendant's stepfather, Neil Robins, who no longer lived 
with defendant's mother, testified for the defense. He stated 
that the gun belonged to him and that he had left it on a shelf 
in an upstairs bedroom (R. 696-700). 
Defendant also testified. He denied putting the .357 
revolver in his dresser or knowing it was there (R. 724-25) . He 
denied having told Detective Swanson that he had shot up 
methamphetamine the night before or directing Swanson to the gun 
(R. 726-3 0). He denied that any of the drugs found in his room 
were his (R. 724) .7 With respect to his conversation with Allen, 
defendant denied everything except that he did not put Allen's 
name on the cartridge and that he had been using drugs (R. 73 0-
32). Defendant claimed that Allen was his friend (R. 732-33). 
7
 On cross examination, Crittenden also denied that any 
of the drugs, paraphernalia or the .357 revolver belonged to 
defendant and that all drug evidence was attributable to her (R. 
642-47) . 
11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The challenged evidence, a cartridge bearing the name of 
defendant's former parole supervisor, was properly admitted to 
show that defendant, and not his living companion, had possession 
of a firearm located in a bedroom they both shared. After 
finding the evidence highly probative, the trial court correctly 
weighed probativeness against the prejudice associated with the 
cartridge and reasonably ruled the evidence admissible by 
forbidding reference to the parole officer-parolee relationship 
suggested by the evidence. 
Even if there was any error in admitting the cartridge, it 
was harmless because defendant failed to object to evidence 
plainly suggesting his relationship with his parole officer when 
it was introduced at trial and because evidence of defendant's 
prior conviction of a crime of violence was necessarily 
admissible to prove an element of the felon in possession charge. 
POINT IJ 
Because defendant's motion for a mistrial was based on his 
parole officer's reference to defendant's connection to stolen 
snow blowers, and not on any revelation that the witness had been 
his parole officer, defendant's argument he was prejudiced by the 
revelation of the relationship has been waived. Any prejudice 
associated with the reference to the snow blowers was cured by an 
12 
appropriate instruction to the jury. Any prejudice was further 
vitiated by the introduction of other substantial evidence, not 
objected to, of defendant's criminal background and assaultive 
nature, and by overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
POINT III 
Defendant's becoming silent occured in a context suggesting 
his protectiveness of a companion, rather than a wish to conceal 
his guilt. Therefore, a police officer's testimony regarding 
defendant's post-arrest silence is only an ambiguous comment on 
the right to silence. Even if the testimony constituted improper 
comment on defendant's post-arrest silence, it was not 
prejudicial. The comment was isolated and not later referenced 
in closing argument. Most significantly, the evidence of 
defendant's guilt was overwhelming. 
The prosecutor's cross examination of a minor witness 
through leading questions referencing a prior meeting between the 
witness and the prosecutor did not amount to the prosecutor's 
giving testimony in violation of defendant's right to 
confrontation. Unlike witnesses who refuse to respond to 
questions, thus making it impossible for a defendant to cross 
examine them, the witness in this case was responsive. Further, 
since the prosecutor was a witness to the relevant conversation, 




DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING A CARTRIDGE ON WHICH THE NAME 
OF DEFENDANT'S PAROLE OFFICER WAS WRITTEN. ANY ERROR 
IN THE COURT'S RULING IS HARMLESS BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO TIMELY OBJECT TO EVIDENCE COMPARABLE TO THE 
ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
A. The Trial Court Properly Balanced the Probative 
Value of the Evidence Against its Potential for 
Unfair Prejudice and Did Not Abuse its Discretion 
in Crafting a Ruling that Prohibited the Introduction 
of Prejudicial Testimony While Admitting Highly 
Probative Evidence. 
In this case defense counsel filed a motion in limine (R. 
77), arguing that the cartridge with the name "K. Allen" written 
on it should be excluded from the evidence (Hearing on motion in 
limine, R. 393-402, attached at Addendum B). Specifically, 
counsel argued that the cartridge had limited relevance because 
the prosecution needed only to prove that defendant, a restricted 
person, was in possession of the gun. However, counsel argued, 
the prejudice was extreme because the cartridge plainly suggested 
that defendant was intending to use deadly force on his probation 
officer (R. 394-97). On appeal, defendant makes substantially 
the same argument. Appellant's Br. at 11-14. Although defendant 
does not explicitly state as much, it is apparent that rules 4 03 
and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, govern the analysis of the 
issues raised. Applying those provisions and the relevant case 
law to the facts, defendant's arguments fail. 
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1. The Law. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, reads: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Rule*404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not 
exclusion. State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994). 
&££ also State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982) (rule 
"has syntax at odds with its substance"); State v. O'Neil. 848 
P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993); State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Jamison. 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989). But see 
State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988) ("evidence of 
other crimes is generally inadmissible"). "Prior bad act 
evidence is only excluded where the sole reason it is being 
offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted 
in conformity with that character." O'Neil. 848 P.2d at 700. 
"The admission of evidence under Rule 4 04 is a question of 
law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness." State 
v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App. 1994) (citing O'Neil. 
848 P.2d at 698). "'However, the trial court's subsidiary 
factual determinations should be given deference by the appellate 
court and only be overruled if they are clearly erroneous.'" Id. 
(quoting O'Neil. at 698-99) . 
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2. The Trial Court did not Err in Admitting the Cartridge 
to Show Knowledge and Intent. 
On appeal defendant argues that the only real purpose for 
introducing the cartridge was to show that defendant had 
previously been convicted of violent crimes and that he had an 
intention to commit another such crime. Appellant's Br. at 13. 
That argument does little justice to the genuine relevance and 
significance of the cartridge, apart from any prejudice attached 
to it. £££ State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) 
("To give meaning to the policy embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence 
of other crimes must be reasonably necessary and highly probative 
of a material issue.1'). 
The prosecutor informed the court that there were two people 
in the room when the .357 was discovered, defendant and 
Crittenden (R. 397). As the prosecutor plainly foresaw, and the 
subsequent trial proceedings make perfectly clear, the defense to 
the felon in possession charge was based largely on the 
possibility that Crittenden, and not defendant, had possession of 
the revolver, evidenced by her attempts at selling the weapon (R. 
642-47, 724-25, 790). Therefore, any evidence linking defendant, 
and not Crittenden, to the cartridge was extremely probative. 
The prosecutor supplied that link, informing the court that "this 
defendant is the only person who has any connection to Kim Allen" 
(R. 397), and that as far as he knew, Crittenden had never been 
on parole prior to this incident (R. 398-99). 
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On these facts, unrebutted by defendant,8 it is apparent 
that the trial court was correct in stating: "If there's a 
serious issue concerning whether there -- the gun is his or not 
his, then it seems to me that the probative value of this is 
fairly significant (R. 400). 
3. The Trial Court's Carefully Tailored Ruling Allowed 
the Admission of Evidence that was not More 
Prejudicial than it was Probative. 
Defendant asserts error in the trial court's ruling by 
repeatedly arguing that its error derives from the prejudicial 
effect of the parolee-parole relationship, which signals 
defendant's having committed prior crimes. This claim seems to 
overlook precisely the prejudicial component that the trial court 
excluded from evidence: 
THE COURT: If there's a serious issue concerning 
whether there -- the gun is his or not his, then it 
seems to me that the probative value of this is fairly 
significant. I agree with Mr. Hutchison's analysis, 
that's a more devastating part of that when you think 
back to the nature of the relationship between Mr. 
Allen and the -- and the defendant. I would therefore 
instruct and grant the motion in limine at least to 
this extent: That the State can talk about the fact 
that they are acquainted, they've had associations in 
the past, and that the defendant might have reason to 
be angry at Kim Allen. That there might be some 
8
 Defendant fails to marshal any of the above-
referenced evidence that the prosecutor presented in opposition 
to defendant's motion, and on which it relied, in finding that 
the evidence was highly probative. *[A]s a preliminary matter, 
defendant must marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as 
found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even, viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." State 
v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 930 (Utah App. 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
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acrimony if indeed that's the case. And I don't know 
whether that's the case of not. But that they are not 
to reference the fact that the relationship arose out 
of a parole officer-parolee relationship. 
(R. 400-01). 
Contrary also to defendant's assertion, the trial court made 
findings as to prejudice under rule 403. Rule 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. Rule 403, like 404(b) is an xinclusionary' 
rule. State v. Lindaren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1996). 
"[Rule 403] presumes the admission of all relevant evidence 
except where the evidence has xan unusual propensity to unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead' the jury." Id. (quoting State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993)). "Moreover, the fact 
that evidence is prejudicial does not, by itself, render that 
evidence inadmissible. Rather, x [i]f the evidence is prejudicial 
but is at least equally probative[,] . . . it is properly 
admissible.'" State v. Ramirez, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 
App. 1996) (quoting State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 571 (Utah App. 
1991). 
In balancing the probative value of rule 4 04(b) evidence 
against the danger of unfair prejudice, the trial court should 
consider certain factors, such as identified in Shickles: 
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(1) the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, (2) the similarities between the crimes, (3) the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, (4) the 
need for the evidence, (5) the efficacy of alternative proof, and 
(6) the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury 
to overmastering hostility. Shickles. 760 P.2d at 295. 
Applying the Shickles factors, to the extent they are 
relevant, the trial court's admission of the cartridge was not an 
abuse of discretion. First, the "crime" of being associated with 
Kim Allen, defendant's former parole supervisor, is undisputed. 
Nor does defendant challenge on appeal that defendant was not 
responsible for writing Allen's name on the cartridge.9 See 
State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775, 778-79 (Utah 1977) (admitting 
evidence of prior crimes for which the defendant had not been 
convicted to show intent). 
Second, it is unclear how long it had been since defendant 
wrote Allen's name on the cartridge. However, Allen testified 
that defendant told him the name had been applied to the bullet 
at a party (R. 746). The character of this testimony, plus 
Crittenden's admission that she had gotten the bullets from 
Morrell and taken them "home," plainly referring to defendant's 
house (R. 635), suggests that this series of events was fairly 
9
 Although defendant denied that he had written Allen's 
name on the cartridge, he admitted that he knew Allen's name had 
been applied to a .380 cartridge (R. 730, 732). 
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recent. Moreover, while it is also unclear how long prior to 
this incident defendant was supervised by Allen, there is no 
doubt that there relationship was ongoing. In testifying why 
defendant might have been upset with him, Allen noted that he had 
accompanied police to defendant's house only one month before his 
arrest in this case (R. 683). O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 (evidence 
of conviction three years previous not excessive); State v. 
Morrell. 803 P.2d 292, 296 (Utah App. 1990) (evidence of robbery 
one month prior properly admitted). 
Third, as noted above, the need for the evidence was great. 
The prosecutor accurately foresaw that defendant's principal 
defense to the felon in possession charge was that Crittenden, 
and not defendant, had possession of the gun (R. 397-98). The 
cartridge bearing the name of defendant's, not Crittenden's, 
former parole supervisor was necessary to rebut that defense. 
The prosecutor was not required to undercut the State's case even 
though there was alternative evidence connecting defendant to the 
weapon. 
Finally, the jury would not likely have been roused to 
"overmastering hostility" by the admission of the challenged 
evidence. As discussed below, the jury would necessarily learn 
that defendant had previously been convicted of other felony 
offenses, including crimes of violence. Moreover, by excluding 
reference to the parole officer-parolee relationship, the trial 
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court excised a significant prejudicial component associated with 
the cartridge. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting defendant's motion in limine by 
conditionally admitting the cartridge. 
B. Any Error in Admitting the Cartridge was Harmless 
Because Defendant Failed to Object to Evidence Plainly 
Suggesting his Relationship with His Parole Officer 
When it wfrg Xntrp^ced frt Tri»l »n£ Because Evidence 
of Defendant's Prior Conviction of a Crime of Violence 
was Necessarily Admissible to Prove an Element of the 
Qffenge. 
In any event, any error in the court's ruling allowing the 
admission of the cartridge with the condition : ..at no reference 
be made to the parole officer-parolee relationship was, at most 
harmless.10 See State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah App. 
1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) (finding harmless 
any possible error in allowing the admission of potentially 
prejudicial testimony when defendant failed to object to other 
testimony having substantially the same import). 
10
 In declining to present a separate discussion in 
support of the trial court's ruling, the State does not suggest 
that the ruling was unsound. Rather, such argument is 
unnecessary in the light of defendant's significant procedural 
failures and the patent harmlessness of any error. Indeed, the 
State assumes that the obvious relevance of the writing on the 
bullet, particularly in light of the contested issue of 
possession, makes plain that the court's conditional ruling was 
not an abuse of discretion. See State v. Ramirez, 299 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 7, 8-9 (Utah App. 1996) (evidence of prior criminal activity 
properly admitted under rules 
403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, to show knowledge and 
intent, considering the similarity in prior criminal conduct, the 
need for the evidence, and its limited potential for inflaming 
the jury). 
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On direct examination Kim Allen testified that he was the 
District Supervisor for AP&P, that he had known defendant for 
about fifteen years, that at defendant's request he visited 
defendant in jail, that defendant confessed that he had "falien 
off the wagon," but denied that he had been dealing drugs or was 
responsible for the writing on the cartridge (R. 660-65). It is 
apparent from Allen's and defendant's conversation that the jury 
would readily have inferred that the parole officer-parolee 
relationship existed between Allen and defendant. However, 
defendant did not object to Allen's testimony. Indeed, on cross 
examination defense counsel himself elicited that this 
conversation took place about a year after defendant had gotten 
"off parole" (R. 669). Further, Allen testified on rebuttal, 
again without objection, that defendant admitted that he had been 
a collection agent for drug dealers in the past and that he had 
not used a firearm in making his collection rounds, but rather 
needed only to raise his voice because "his reputation [for being 
assaultive] preceded him" (R. 747). 
Additionally, the State was required to prove that defendant 
had previously been convicted of "any crime of violence," in 
order to convict defendant of being a felon in possession.11 
11
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995), providing for the 
offense of being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon, 
states: 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime 
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Evidence of defendant's having committed both a burglary and an 
assault as a prisoner was admitted without objection (R. 524-26, 
657-59). The jury was instructed on the required elements of the 
offense in the language of the statute, and further, that 
burglary and assault by a prisoner were crimes of violence (R. 
349-51). 
In sum, because defendant failed to object to evidence 
plainly suggesting his relationship with his parole officer, his 
prior criminal activities and assaultive nature and because 
evidence of defendant's prior conviction of a crime of violence 
was necessarily admissible to prove an element of the offense, 
any error in the trial court's ruling was harmless. 
of violence under the laws of the United States, this 
state, or any other state, government, or country, or 
who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who 
has been declared mentally incompetent may not own or 
have in his possession or under his custody or control 
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part, 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon 
is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun, he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CHALLENGE IN THE TRIAL 
COURT. ALSO, BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT GAVE THE JURY 
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS, AND BECAUSE EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S PAROLEE-PAROLE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP TO KIM 
ALLEN AND DEFENDANT'S OTHER BAD ACTS HAD PREVIOUSLY 
BEEN UNCOVERED, AND BECAUSE EVIDENCE OF GUILT WAS 
OVERWHELMING, NO PREJUDICE RESULTED FROM THE 
INTRODUCTION OF INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY 
A. Factual Background. 
Kim Allen first testified to his long-standing acquaintance 
with defendant and his visit with defendant about a year after 
defendant had been off parole on the first day of trial, December 
14, 1995 (R. 406, 660-70). In accordance with the court's ruling 
on the motion in limine, the prosecutor called Allen the 
following day to ask him about why defendant might have been 
upset with him:12 
MR. HEWARD: All right. A couple of things that I 
didn't ask you yesterday. Specifically, have you in 
your job, your experience, do you regularly deal with 
meth users and sellers? 
MR. ALLEN: Yes, I do. 
12
 Defendant argues that the prosecution's only purpose 
in questioning Allen at this point was to show the jury that 
defendant was angry with Allen, a fact unnecessary to prove any 
element of the felon in possession charge. Appellant's Br. at 
16. However, in conditionally granting the motion in limine, the 
trial court expressly allowed the prosecution to inquire about 
whether there might be any acrimony between the two men (R. 4 00). 
Defendant did not object to this ruling. It is apparent that the 
court allowed this line of questioning because the existence of 
acrimony would help explain why defendant might have written 
Allen's name on the cartridge. See State v. Morgar>r 813 P.2d 
1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (finding no error or violation of 
rule 4 04, Utah Rules of Evidence, in the admission of other bad 
acts inflicted on a nonparty because "the prosecutor is entitled 
to paint a factual picture of the context in which the events in 
question transpired, and citing numerous cases in support). 
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MR. HEWARD: And is it common for you to see people who 
are using and selling meth to become extremely 
paranoid? 
MR. ALLEN: Yes, that's one of the characteristics. 
It's one of the problems with meth. 
MR. HEWARD: All right. Based on that, when you found 
out that there was a bullet recovered with your name on 
it in a search warrant of Mr. Morrison's home, did that 
cause you concern? 
MR. ALLEN: Yes, it did. 
MR. HEWARD: Did you stop and think abut anything that 
could occurred in the time period immediately prior to 
this that could have caused him --
MR. ALLEN: Yes. 
MR. HEWARD: -- to be upset with you? 
MR. ALLEN: Yes, I did. 
MR. HEWARD: What would that have been? 
MR. ALLEN: Probably, oh, maybe a month prior to Mike's 
arrest, I'd been working late and was notified over the 
radio that the Strike Force needed some assistance on a 
search at Mike Morrison's house and was wondering if I 
knew where he lived and if I'd been there. I told 
them, yeah, I knew the family well. So I assisted Mike 
Ashment and a couple of deputies from Davis County. We 
went to Mike's home, recovered some stolen property, 
stolen snow blowers from his place, and then Mike took 
us over to another place and got another stolen snow 
blower. So I figure maybe that got him upset with me. 
(R. 682-83). 
B« Defendant Failed to Preserve in the Trial Court his 
Challenge on Appeal that Allen's Testimony 
Prejudicially Signaled His Relationship with his 
Parole Officer in Violation of the Ruling on the 
Motion in Limine, 
Defendant principally argues that Allen's testimony 
prejudicially signaled his relationship with his parole officer, 
in violation of the court's ruling on the motion in limine 
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expressly precluding reference to that relationship. Appellant's 
Br. at 14-18. However, by failing to preserve this particular 
objection in the course of moving for a mistrial, defendant has 
waived this aspect of his challenge to the court's denial of his 
motion. 
11
 [0] rdinarily, [the reviewing court] will not entertain an 
issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances or plain error." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (Utah 1987); Price. 837 P.2d at 580-01 (Utah App. 1992). 
The rationale for this rule was stated by this Court in State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993): 
The purpose of requiring a properly presented objection 
is to 'put[] the judge on notice of the asserted error 
and allow[] the opportunity for correction at that time 
in the course of the proceeding.' Broberg v. Hess, 782 
P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989). The trial court is 
considered 'the proper forum in which to commence 
thoughtful and probing analysis' of issues. State v. 
Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). 
Id. at 359-60. 
Immediately following Allen's testimony, defendant requested 
a side bar conference (R. 683).13 Out of the hearing of the jury 
defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the testimony 
had referenced stolen snow blowers, evidence of other uncharged 
crime, and was therefore prejudicial (R. 684). The prosecutor 
argued that the testimony gave evidence of motive and that in his 
13
 The entire colloquy bearing on defendant's motion 
for a mistrial, including the court's curative instruction, is 
attached at Addendum C. 
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questions he had stayed strictly away from the issue of the 
excluded relationship (R. 684) . In response, defendant again 
argued that he was entitled to a mistrial because the testimony 
had nullified the court's ruling on the motion in limine by 
indicating crimes defendant had not even been convicted of, 
including receiving stolen property (R. 6 85) . The trial court 
thought the testimony had only limited relevance to motive, but 
considered reference to the snow blowers irrelevant and highly 
prejudicial, though not warranting a mistrial (R. 685-87). After 
the parties concluded that charges relating to the snow blowers 
had been dismissed, the trial court suggested a curative 
instruction, informing the jury that charges had been filed and 
then dismissed, that testimony as to the snow blowers was 
irrelevant and that they should disregard it (R. 688-87). 
Defendant agreed with the court that the instruction should be 
given immediately, though he did not withdraw his motion (R. 
688). Attempting to remedy what it thought prejudicial, the 
court instructed the jury: 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, quite 
frequently during the course of a trial, things will 
come up unexpectedly which really shouldn't come to 
your attention. There has been some testimony that --
that the defendant in this case was involved with some 
stolen snow blowers. 
Now, that hasn't got anything at all to do with 
this case and I'm instructing you specifically that 
you're to completely disregard it. And just to kind of 
back up and fortify the importance of not considering 
it, the Court's instructing you that charges were filed 
and dismissed. 
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So that's not something that, in fairness, you 
ought to consider when you're determining the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant in this case. 
(R. 689). 
It is apparent that defense counsel at trial did not believe 
that the prejudice that flowed from Allen's testimony grew from 
any suggestion of the excluded relationship beyond that which had 
already come to light during the previous day's testimony, or 
that the court's ruling on the motion in limine had been violated 
by reference to the excluded relationship. Rather, defendant's 
motion plainly went only the prejudicial reference to the stolen 
snow blowers. Because defendant failed to alert the trial court 
to an allegation of prejudice related to the excluded 
relationship, thereby giving the court an opportunity to consider 
the matter and craft a different curative instruction, 
defendant's challenge has been waived for appeal. However, even 
considering defendant's claim, it lacks merit because the jury 
was instructed at the time of the testimony, and again when it 
retired, to disregard reference to the snow blowers, and because 
the testimony was not prejudicial in the context of the entire 
body of evidence. 
C. Any Prejudice Relating to Allen's Testimony was 
Either Cured by the Jury Instructions or Failed to 
Warrant a Mistrial in the Context of All the Evidence. 
*\A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for 
a mistrial and its decision will remain undisturbed absent an 
abuse of that discretion. R^gmygsen v. Shfrrfrpata, 895 P.2d 391, 
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3 94 (Utah App. 1995) . A defendant has the burden of persuading 
this court that the conduct complained of prejudiced the outcome 
of the trial. State v. Boone. 820 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah App. 
1991)." Price. 909 P.2d at 262. 
Discussing the prejudice necessary to sustain a motion for a 
mistrial, the Court in Burk stated that [e]vidence is unfairly 
prejudicial, 
if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the 
trial by improper means, or if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror, provokes 
its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to 
base its decision on something other than the 
established propositions of the case. 
839 P.2d at 883 (citing Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.. 
605 P.2d 314, 323 n.31 (Utah 1979) (citation omitted), overruled 
on other grounds. MgFarl&nfl v. Skaggg COS., Inc./ 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984)). 
In Burk. a witness testified that she knew the defendant had 
"done this." Id. at 882. The trial court sustained the 
defendant's objection and ordered the statement stricken. Id. 
The same witness also testified that the defendant's sister-in-
law had told her that the defendant "was going to cut her up." 
Id. The defendant asked that the jury be excused and moved for a 
mistrial on the grounds that such testimony was prejudicial and 
could not be cured by an appropriate instruction. The trial 
court denied the motion, but instructed the jury to disregard the 
witness's statements. Id. Relying on the assumption that the 
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jury was conscientious in following instructions, this Court held 
that the defendant had not been unduly prejudiced, based on the 
lower court's curative instructions and on the defendant's 
failure to show that the statements were so prejudicial as to 
deny him a fair trial. Id. at 883. As a further reason for 
holding the lower court had not abused its discretion, the Court 
noted that the defendant had failed to object to substantially 
equivalent testimony of the defendant's prior threats to other 
witnesses. Id. at 883-84. See also State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 
1232, 1242-44 (Utah), cert, denied. 510 U.S. 979, 114 S. Ct. 476 
(1993) (finding mistrial unwarranted where the court informed 
the jury that testimony was inadmissible, incredible and 
suggested an insupportable view of the offense). 
In this case the trial court informed the jury that charges 
related to the snow blowers had been dismissed, that reference to 
them was irrelevant and that they should disregard the reference 
(R. 689). Further, the court's written instructions twice 
informed the jury that it was not to consider stricken evidence 
(See Jury instructions #8 and #16, R. 335, 343). 
Further, the reference to stolen snow blowers or allusion to 
the excluded relationship could not have prejudiced defendant, 
considering the evidence as a whole. First, Allen merely stated 
that he was asked by police officers if he knew defendant and 
that he accompanied them on a search of defendant's home (R. 
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683). From this statement it is not at all clear that Allen 
exposed the parole officer-parolee relationship between defendant 
and him. In any event, their relationship was no more exposed by 
this testimony than it was when Allen testified earlier, without 
objection, that he, a parole officer, had known defendant for 
fifteen years and that defendant had been on parole (R. 660-69) . 
Second, as discussed above, Allen's statements only disclosed 
about defendant's criminal background what the jury would 
necessarily discover in hearing evidence of defendant's prior 
violent, criminal offenses, offered to prove him a felon in 
possession. Thus, references to dismissed charges related to 
stolen snow blowers were trivial and cumulative evidence of 
defendant's criminal disposition, evidence of which was properly 
admitted. Br. at 22-23. 
Most importantly, evidence of defendant's guilt was 
overwhelming. See State v. Seel. 827 P.2d 954 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) (mere allegation of prejudice 
in failing to sever charges insufficient for reversal in light 
overwhelming evidence of guilt on each charge). In response to 
whether there was a gun in the room, defendant directed Detective 
Swanson to his dresser (R. 510). The .357 revolver was found in 
a drawer of that dresser containing defendant's personal effects 
and papers (R. 546-48) . Crittenden admitted that she neither 
loaded the gun nor knew how the bullets got into the gun (R. 635-
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36). Even though defendant took the stand, he offered no 
explanation about how the gun got from the upstairs bedroom, 
where his step father claimed he had left it, to defendant's 
dresser drawer in his bedroom (R. 696-700). Defendant's 
conviction for two crimes of violence was undisputed (R. 525, 
573, 658-59). The evidence was also overwhelming on the drug 
possession conviction.14 Defendant told Detective Swanson that 
he had shot up with methamphetamine and used a little marijuana 
the night before the search (R. 509). Defendant admitted to 
Allen that he had "fallen off the wagon" and that he needed to 
"get himself back together again" (R. 665). Defendant's bedroom 
was littered throughout with drugs and paraphernalia. 
Particularly, syringes were observed on the nightstand and 
methamphetamine and marijuana were found in the nightstand (R. 
505-06, 545-46). 
14
 Insofar as possession is an element of both the drug 
and weapons charges, the prosecution was only required to show 
that defendant had constructive possession. As the jury was 
instructed, constructive possession does not require actual 
possession, but only a right to control the thing at issue, which 
might be shared by more than one person (Jury instructions #27 
and #28, R. 353-54). Thus, the evidence of defendant's 
possession, even if shared with Crittenden, assumes even greater 
proportions and virtually nullifies the defense. See State v. 
Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (constructive 
possession requires "there [] be a nexus between the accused and 
the drug sufficient enough to allow an inference that the accused 
had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over the drug")(citing State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 319 
(Utah 1985)). 
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In sum, any error in denying defendant's motion for a 
mistrial was harmless considering that comparably prejudicial 
evidence was properly admitted without objection and evidence of 
defendant's guilt was overwhelming. 
POINT III 
ANY PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN COMMENTING ON 
DEFENDANT'S POST-ARREST SILENCE WAS HARMLESS, AND THERE 
WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CONFRONTING A 
HOSTILE WITNESS WHO DENIED CERTAIN EVENTS 
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor inappropriately 
commented on defendant's post-arrest silence in the course of 
questioning two of the State's witnesses. Acknowledging that 
trial counsel failed to object, he argues that the questioning 
constituted plain error entitling him to a reversal of his 
conviction. 
"To establish plain error, a party must show the following: 
(1) an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (3) the error was harmful, or in other 
words, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for the complaining party." State v. 
Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. 
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). "The claim of plain 
error fails if any one of these requirements is not shown." Id. 
(citing Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209). 
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A. Any Error from Comment on Defendant's Post-Arrest 
Silgnge JB Hfrrmlegg Bgypnd ^ figagpn^ble Dpyfrt» 
The prosecutor elicited from Officer Price that following 
defendant's arrest and the giving of Miranda warnings, defendant 
initially appeared willing to talk to him (Price) (R. 498, 504-
05). The prosecutor then asked if Crittenden did anything to 
stop defendant from talking, and Officer Price stated that 
defendant stopped talking in response to Crittenden's twice 
telling defendant to shut up (R. 498-99) . Later, the prosecutor 
also elicited from Crittenden that she told defendant to shut up 
upon advice from her lawyer, with whom she was then on the 
telephone (R. 648-49) .15 
It is well-established that comments about a defendant's 
remaining silent after an arrest are frowned upon and may be 
grounds for reversal. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619-20, 96 S. 
Ct. 2242, 2245-46 (1976); State v. Wiswell. 639 P.2d 146, 147 
(Utah 1981); State v. Sorrels. 642 P.2d 373, 375 (Utah 1982) (per 
curiam); Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057. 
Testimony elicited from Crittenden is not subject to the 
prohibition against prosecutorial comment on the right to silence 
because that testimony does not indicate that defendant responded 
to Crittenden's direction to keep quiet. See United States v. 
Warren. 578 F.2d 1058, 1072-73 (1978), modified by 612 F.2d 887 
15
 The transcript of the colloquies with Officer Price 
and Crittenden are attached at Addendum D. 
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(5th Cir.), cert, denied. 446 U.S. 956, 100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980) 
(holding that testimony of federal agent that a codefendant 
requested other codefendants remain silent was not improper 
comment on the right to silence absent the defendant's reaction 
to the advice). 
The State recognizes that Officer Price's testimony might be 
regarded as improper comment on defendant's right to silence. 
However, the context in which the reference was made does not 
comport with the policy forbidding improper comment, to wit: 
protecting a defendant from the negative inferences which may be 
drawn from necessarily "ambiguous" silence. See Doyle, 426 U.S. 
at 616-18, 96 S. Ct. at 2244-45. In this case defendant's 
silence at Crittenden's behest might well be recognized, not as 
an attempt to hide his guilt, but to protect Crittenden. Thus, 
the alleged impropriety is ambiguous. However, even if the Court 
finds this testimony to be improper comment, defendant has failed 
to show that the error was harmful. 
In evaluating whether the prosecutor's reference to 
defendant's post-arrest silence prejudiced defendant, the court 
may consider the following factors: Ml) whether the jury would 
'naturally and necessarily construe' the comment as referring to 
defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence 
of defendant's guilt; (3) whether the reference was isolated; and 
(4) whether the trial court instructed the jury not to draw any 
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adverse presumption from defendant's decision not to testify." 
Reyes. 861 P.2d at 1057 (citing State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 
554-55 (Utah 1987) ) . 
Applying this test it is apparent that defendant was not 
prejudiced by Officer Price's testimony. Although the reference 
to defendant's being unwilling to talk would naturally have been 
recognized as a comment referring to defendant's silence, the 
comment was isolated and not even referred to in closing 
argument. See Reyes. 861 P.2d at 1056-57 (finding that a 
similarly distinctive comment was isolated under the Tillman 
factors). No curative instruction was given, but this factor 
must be tempered with the fact that defendant did not object, 
thereby depriving the trial court of an opportunity to rectify 
any error. £jL. State v. Chyjgtpfferscn/ 793 P.2d 944, (Utah App. 
1990) (affirming conviction in spite of prosecutor's failure to 
inform opposing counsel of the defendant's exculpatory statement, 
where the defendant moved only to dismiss rather than giving 
trial court opportunity to mitigate the damage by continuing the 
trial or excluding unanticipated testimony); but see Reyes, 861 
P.2d at 1057 (finding inadequate trial court's curative 
instruction in case where no objection was made at the time of 
the improper comment). 
Most significant, however, is the overwhelming evidence of 
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defendant's guilt, as discussed above. Appellee's Br. at 31-32. 
See State v. Bartley. 784 P.2d 1231, 1237-38 (Utah App. 1989) 
(finding prosecutorial inquiry into codefendant's post-arrest 
silence, timely objected to, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
based on the isolatedness of comment, overwhelming evidence and 
curative instruction). Indeed, it would not appear that the 
proscription against comment on the right to silence from Doyle 
and its progeny have much relevance to a case in which defendant 
led police officers to evidence more than sufficient to convict 
him before he invoked his right to silence. In any case, given 
the massive evidence of defendant's guilt, the outcome in this 
case would not have been different even if the comment had not 
been made. 
B. There was no Prosecutorial Misconduct in Confronting 
a Hostile Witness Who Denied Certain Events, 
The prosecutor called Johnny Morrell to give testimony 
further indicating that defendant was a dope dealer (R. 652-56). 
In laying a foundation for Morrell's testimony, the prosecutor 
asked Morrell if he recalled a conversation that Morrell had with 
him in the presence of Kim Allen at the time of defendant's bail 
hearing (R. 653). Morrell said he did not recall the 
conversation and asked him what the conversation was about (R. 
653). When the prosecutor began to describe the setting, 
defendant objected, arguing that the prosecutor was effectively 
testifying about the conversation (R. 653-54). Accepting that 
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prosecutor was simply trying to refresh Morrell's recollection, 
the trial court overruled the objection (R. 654). Thereafter, 
the following conversation ensued: 
MR. HEWARD: Isn't it true you walked up to me and Mr. 
Allen as well and we were out by the elevator and you 
specifically said, "Why are you guys being so hard on 
Mike?" 
MORRELL: Yes, probably. 
MR. HEWARD: Okay. And isn't it true that my response 
was because Mike was a dope dealer? 
MORRELL: Yes. 
MR. HEWARD: And isn't it true that when I said that --
and in Mr. Allen's presence -- you simply went "so?" 
MORRELL: No. 
MR. HEWARD: You didn't do that? 
MORRELL: I told you -- I told you that Mike was about 
the only friend that was trying to get me to stop dope, 
is what I told you. 
MR. HEWARD: That was what you told me in Mr. Aliens's 
presence. 
MORRELL: Yes, sir. 
MR. HEWARD: You didn't acknowledge that Mike was a dope 
dealer? 
MORRELL: I told you he was before and he quit and he 
was trying to make me quit so he could get --we could 
get a business going. 
MR. HEWARD: Okay. So you specifically don't remember, 
in Mr. Allen's presence in response to my statement of 
him being a dope dealer, your saying uso?" 
MORRELL: No. 
MR. HEWARD: Your answer is you don't remember that? 
MORRELL: No, I -- I don't remember talking to you and 
Mr. Allen outside in the hall. I remember Mr. Allen 
coming over and talking to me downstairs in the jail, 
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asking me if I thought Mike was dangerous or not, and I 
said no. 
MR. HEWARD: Okay. You just indicated that you did 
remember it two minutes ago. Now you're indicating you 
don't remember it? 
MORRELL: I -- I don't remember talking to you. I 
remember talking to Mr. Allen like three times. 
MR. HEWARD: Didn't you just testify, Mr. Morrell, as to 
what the substance of our conversation was standing 
outside the elevator on the 5th floor? 
MORRELL: Yes. 
(R. 654-56). 
Based on this colloquy, defendant argues that his right to 
confront witnesses under article I, section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Appellant's Br. at 21-24. Particularly, defendant 
asserts that by asking the witness questions referring in some 
detail to their earlier conversation, the prosecutor improperly 
testified to facts about which he could not be cross examined. 
In support of his claim, defendant relies exclusively on State v. 
Villareal. 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). 
In Villareal. the codefendant refused to answer a long 
series of leading questions based on his confession. Id. 889 
P.2d at 422-23. Thereafter, the prosecutor called a police 
officer to confirm the substance of the codefendant's confession. 
Id. at 423. The supreme court held that the prosecutor's 
presentation of the codefendant's testimony, coupled with the 
police officer's testimony, was a denial of the defendant's right 
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of confrontation because neither the witness nor the prosecutor 
was subject to cross-examination. Id. Moreover, the denial of 
effective cross examination was exacerbated by the inherent 
unreliability of any codefendant's confession. Id. at 424-25. 
Villareal has no application to this case, if for no other 
reason than that Morrell did not refuse to testify, but rather 
denied the prosecutor's allegations. See id. at 425 (indicating 
that defendant was denied the effective opportunity for cross 
examination because the witness was "wholly nonresponsive" with 
respect to assertions about defendant and because he would 
neither confirm nor deny facts central to establishing the 
defendant's guilt). Thus, because Morrell was willing to respond 
to questions, he was subject to effective cross examination. 
Secondly, because the prosecutor was a witness to the events 
about which he was cross examining Morrell about, he too was 
subject to cross-examination. In any event, Morrell's testimony 
was cumulative of Lieutenant Zimmerman's and Allen's as to 
defendant's prior drug dealing, and was not particularly 




For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '/-£ day of November, 1996. 
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Attorney General 
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76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon/ 
handgun — Persons not permitted to have — 
Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
•shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary 
device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice» confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, except 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
ADDENDUM B 
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OGDEN, UTAH AUGUST 2. 1995 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. HUTCHISON: WELL, THIS IS THE MORRISON MATTER. IT'S 
MY MOTION IN LIMINY. AND HERE'S THE CIRCUMSTANCES: ONE OF 
THE TWO CHARGES THAT THE DEFENDANT IS FACING IS THE POSSESSION 
OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A PERSON CONVICTED OF A FELONY. PART 
OF THE EVIDENCE IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE — YOU MAY WANT TO 
READ THE TRANSCRIPT WE HAVE OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. PART 
OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE OBVIOUSLY IS A PISTOL AND SOME 
BULLETS THAT CAME OUT OF THE PISTOL. THE PROSECUTION CLAIMS 
THAT ONE OF THOSE BULLETS HAD KIM ALLEN'S, THE PROBATION 
OFFICER WHO WAS MICHAEL MORRISON'S PROBATION OFFICER, HAS A K. 
AND THE WORD ALLEN WRITTEN ON THE CASING. AND THEY SAY THAT 
STANDS SUGGESTIVELY AT LEAST FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT MR. 
MORRISON MAY HAVE BEEN CONTEMPLATING USING THAT BULLET OR THAT 
GUN ON HIS PROBATION OFFICER. THE CHARGE ITSELF IS JUST 
POSSESSION OF A FIREARM. OF COURSE, THERE'S A CERTAIN AMOUNT 
OF CONJECTURE IN THAT. 
I WANT YOU TO LOOK AT THE BULLET BECAUSE I DON'T THINK 
YOU CAN EVEN READ KIM ALLEN ON THE CASING OF THE BULLET. WHEN 
I SAY THAT, EVEN IF YOU DO BELIEVE THAT THE BULLET SAYS KIM 
ALLEN ON IT, THAT THERE'S A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF CONJECTURE IN 
THAT ARGUMENT THAT THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF PERMITTING THE 
STATE TO TELL A JURY OR A FACT FINDER, DEPENDING ON WHO IT 
WAS, THAT MICHAEL — THAT THIS BULLET HAD MICHAEL MORRISON'S 
394 
3 
PROBATION OFFICER'S NAME ON IT, SUGGESTING WHATEVER THAT 
SUGGESTS, IS ~ THE PREJUDICE OF THAT PARTICULAR PIECE OF 
EVIDENCE SO FAR OUTWEIGHS ITS RELEVANCY ABOUT THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT HE'S IN POSSESSION OF THE FIREARM, THAT YOU 
OUGHT TO LIMIT THE PROSECUTION FROM MAKING THAT PARTICULAR 
ARGUMENT AND USING THAT BULLET FOR THAT PURPOSE. 
AFTER YOU DETERMINE WHETHER THE WRITING IS SUFFICIENTLY 
CLEAR ON THE CASING — WE DON'T BELIEVE IT'S SUFFICIENTLY 
CLEAR THAT YOU COULD EVEN AS A MATTER OF CONJECTURE MAKE THAT 
PROPOSITION THAT IT SAYS K. ALLEN ON IT, BUT EVEN IF YOU 
BELIEVE IT DOES, WE SAY THAT ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT FAR 
OUTWEIGHS ITS EVIDENTIARY VALUE. AND IT'S ONE OF THOSE AREAS 
WE HAVE THAT YOU HAVE TO HAVE SOME DISCRETION TO MAKE THAT 
PARTICULAR CALL, LIKE YOU DO OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF A BLOODY 
PHOTO — PHOTOGRAPHS OF A BLOODY CRIME SCENE, AND EVERYTHING 
JUST — AND THE MERE POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON ITSELF, WHICH 
WOULD BE A CRIME IF IT COULD BE PROVED TO BE IN HIS 
POSSESSION. BUT THEN YOU UNDERSTAND THE GUN IS LOCATED IN A 
ROOM WHERE MICHAEL MORRISON IS SLEEPING, IT IS NOT LOCATED ON 
HIS PERSON. AND THEY COME IN PURSUANT TO ~ WELL, THEY COME 
OUT WITH A WARRANT TO SEIZE THE GUN, BUT I ASSUME THAT WE'RE 
USING THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCOVERY IN SEARCH WARRANTS 
AND THE EVIDENCE I SUPPOSE IS TECHNICALLY SEIZED PURSUANT TO 
THAT. 
MR. HEWARD: ACTUALLY, THE FIRST OFFICERS THAT ARRIVE 
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AT MR. MORRISON'S HOME, HIS MOTHER'S HOME WHERE HE'S RESIDING, 
ARRIVE THERE WITH AN ARREST WARRANT FOR HIM ~ 
MR. HUTCHISON: RIGHT. 
MR. HEWARD: — UNRELATED TO — 
MR. HUTCHISON: COMPLETELY. 
MR. HEWARD: — THE SEARCH WARRANT THAT'S ALREADY ON 
ITS WAY. TWO AGENTS ARE FROM LAYTON CITY AND THE STRIKE 
FORCE, NEITHER OF WHICH KNOW THAT THE OTHER ONE IS IN THE 
PROCESS OF SERVING THE WARRANT FOR ARREST OR WARRANT TO 
SEARCH. 
MR. HUTCHISON: RIGHT. IT WAS — THE LAYTON OFFICER 
ONLY HAD AN ARREST WARRANT, WHICH THEY PROBABLY, MY OPINION 
ANYWAY, HE CAN SEIZE IT WHEN HE SEES THAT GUN. NEVERTHELESS, 
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? A SEARCH WARRANT'S COMING 
LATER. AND WE RAN RIGHT INTO THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE 
DISCOVERY UNDER THE SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WAS BEHIND THE WEBER 
COUNTY AGENCY. BUT SINCE THE GUN WASN'T ON HIM, AND YOU HAVE 
TO ARGUE IF THERE'S TWO PEOPLE IN THE ROOM, HE AND A LADY BY 
THE NAME OF JILL CRITTENDEN IN THE ROOM, AND YOU HAVE TO ARGUE 
INFERENTIALLY, CIRCUMSTANTIALLY SHOW THAT HE'S IN POSSESSION 
OF THAT GUN. THEY CAN FURTHER BELIEVE AND SAY WHAT'S MORE 
IMPORTANT IS THE BULLET IN THE GUN HAS KIM ALLEN'S WRITING ON 
THE CASING, AND KIM ALLEN IS MICHAEL'S PROBATION OFFICER, AND 
THAT STANDS FOR BLACK DEEDS THAT ARE CONTEMPLATED BY MR. 
MORRISON, WHICH WE SAY IS FAR TOO PREJUDICIAL TO BE PERMITTED 
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INTO EVIDENCE WHEN WEIGHED AGAINST THE RELEVANCY AND ANY 
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE OVERALL ~ HOW IT ALL FITS TOGETHER. WE 
HAVE A TRANSCRIPT OF A LENGTHY PRELIMINARY HEARING — 
THE COURT: LET ME JUST ASK A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS. 
I ASSUME FROM WHAT MR. HUTCHISON IS SAYING THAT THE WRITING 
THAT YOU HAVE, PERCEIVED WRITING ON THE BULLET, WOULD TIE THE 
WEAPON TO MR. MORRISON? 
MR. HEWARD: CORRECT. WHAT MR. HUTCHISON HASN'T 
RAISED OR — AND I'M NOT SURE THAT HE'S CONTEMPLATED IT, 
ALTHOUGH HE'S LAID YOU A LITTLE BIT OF A BACKGROUND AND 
HISTORY, IS THAT THERE ARE TWO PEOPLE PRESENT IN THE ROOM. 
THERE'S MR. MORRISON AND THERE'S JILL TEETER OR JILL 
CRITTENDEN, WHICH IS THE NAME SHE GOES BY. IT'S THE STATE'S 
POSITION THAT THE REASON THAT THIS SHOULD COME IN AND THE 
REASON THAT THE PROBATIVE VALUE OUTWEIGHS THE PREJUDICIAL 
VALUE UNDER RULE 403 IS THAT THE WRITING ON THERE — AND I 
HAVEN'T REALLY EVEN THOUGHT ABOUT THE ARGUMENT AS FAR AS HIM 
TRYING TO GET HIS PROBATION OFFICER -- IT'S OUR POSITION THAT 
THE REASON THAT IT'S RELEVANT IS, IS BECAUSE THIS DEFENDANT IS 
THE ONLY PERSON WHO HAS ANY CONNECTION TO KIM ALLEN. THE 
BULLET WOULD SHOW A NEXUS BETWEEN THE PERSON WHO LOADED THE 
GUN OR WHO HAD THE BULLETS AND KIM ALLEN, WHICH COMES BACK TO 
THIS DEFENDANT. NOT TO JILL TEETER OR TO JILL CRITTENDEN, 
WHICHEVER NAME SHE GOES BY. THAT'S WHAT I BELIEVE THE 
PROBATIVE VALUE IS SHOWING THE NEXUS TO THIS DEFENDANT BECAUSE 
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HE'S THE PERSON WHO KNOWS KIM ALLEN. 
WHEN MR. HUTCHISON SAID HE'S HIS PROBATION OFFICER, THAT 
IS ACTUALLY SOMETHING IN THE PAST. AT THE TIME THIS GOES 
DOWN, MR. MORRISON IS OFF OF PAROLE. I MEAN HE HAS BEEN 
PREVIOUSLY SUPERVISED BY EITHER MR. ALLEN OR BY AGENTS WHO 
WORK FOR MR. ALLEN IN HIS CAPACITY AS SUPERVISOR FOR ADULT 
PROBATION AND PAROLE. AND MR. MORRISON UNQUESTIONABLY KNOWS 
MR. ALLEN, HAS KNOWN HIM FOR QUITE A PERIOD OF TIME. 
AND I HAVE THE BULLET HERE, BUT WE DON'T THINK THE 
RELEVANCE IS NECESSARILY SHOWING HE WANTS TO GET KIM ALLEN. 
THE RELEVANCE IS SHOWING THAT THIS IS A PERSON WHO KNOWS KIM 
ALLEN, AND THEREBY CONNECTING HIM UP WITH THE GUN BECAUSE MR. 
HUTCHISON POINTS OUT THERE ARE TWO PEOPLE IN THE ROOM. IT'S 
NOT THERE IF HE'S NOT IN POSSESSION OF IT. 
MR. HUTCHISON: WELL, THERE'S A COUPLE OF THINGS I NEED 
TO SAY ABOUT THAT, TOO, YOUR HONOR. WE WANT YOU TO TAKE A 
GOOD LOOK AT IT. IT'S TRUE THERE'S TWO PEOPLE IN THE ROOM, 
BUT IT DIDN'T REALLY OCCUR TO ME — OF COURSE I KNEW IT, BUT 
IT DIDN'T REALLY OCCUR TO ME TO REALLY SAY THE NEXUS ISN'T AS 
IMMEDIATE AS HIM BEING THE PROBATION OFFICER WHICH MAKES THE 
PREJUDICIAL VALUE EVEN MORE. THE FACT THAT HE'S BEEN 
SUPERVISED IN THE PAST BY ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE AND 
ALLEN'S A SUPERVISOR THERE, MAKES IT EVEN MORE TANGENTIAL. 
ARE YOU SURE THAT JILL TEETER WAS NEVER SUPERVISED BY HIM? 
MR. HEWARD: AS FAR AS I KNOW, THAT'S CORRECT. AS 
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FAR AS I KNOW, UNTIL SHE HAD BEEN RECENTLY CONVICTED, SHE HAD 
NEVER BEEN ON PROBATION. 
MR. HUTCHISON: IF YOU WANT TO LOOK AT THE BULLET TO SEE 
IF YOU CAN EVEN READ THAT. 
THE COURT: LET ME LOOK AT IT. 
MR. HUTCHISON: HE DOESN'T WANT YOU SMEARING IT. 
MR. HEWARD: THERE'S ONE ADDITIONAL FACTOR THAT I 
THINK SHOULD PLAY INTO YOUR HONOR'S DETERMINATION, AND THAT 
IS, THE ARREST WARRANT THAT ARRIVES FOR MR. MORRISON ON THAT 
MORNING IS DONE AS A RESULT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT IN A 
STOLEN FRONT TRANSACTION. THERE'S A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 
PERSON THE POLICE USED AND KIM ALLEN ON THAT, AND THIS 
DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE REASON TO KNOW THAT. THEREBY, ANOTHER 
CONNECTION BACK TO KIM ALLEN WITH THE INDIVIDUAL WHO WRITES ON 
THE BULLET OR IS IN POSSESSION OF THE BULLET. 
FOR THE RECORD, MR. OLSEN, I AM SHOWING HIS HONOR A .357 
CALIBER CARTRIDGE. IT IS WHAT IS KNOWN AS BIRDSHOT LOAD, 
NORMAL CASING, AND THEN A CAP THAT YOU CAN LOOK AT AND, 
BECAUSE IT'S TRANSPARENT, SEE THAT THERE ARE B.B.'S IN IT. 
I PROBABLY SHOULD MAKE A FURTHER RECORD, THAT IS ONE OF 
FIVE BULLETS THAT WERE ACTUALLY IN THE FIREARM AT THE TIME. 
NONE OF THE OTHER FIVE HAD ANY WRITING ON THEM. THEY ALL WERE 
.357'S, AT LEAST ONE OF WHICH WAS A SIMILAR BIRDSHOT LOAD AS 
YOU HAVE IN YOUR HAND, AND THE OTHER WHICH WERE STANDARD .357 
LOADED WITH THE STANDARD JACKETED BULLET. 
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MR. HUTCHISON: I THOUGHT THAT AT LEASE ONE AND MAYBE 
TWO WITNESSES SAID THERE WERE SIX SHELLS. 
MR. HEWARD: I DON'T REMEMBER. THERE'S FIVE IN THE 
POUCH, THEY'VE BEEN CHECKED OUT OF EVIDENCE AND BROUGHT UP. 
AND IF I COUNTED CORRECTLY — 
MR. HUTCHISON: I DON'T THINK THAT'S VERY CLEAR AND CAN 
BE READ FOR A LOT OF DIFFERENT PROPOSITIONS, AND WHEN YOU ADD 
THAT INTO THE FACTOR THAT HE WASN'T EVEN BEING SUPERVISED BY 
ALLEN AND THAT DEVASTATING IMPACT OF THAT KIND OF TESTIMONY, I 
SAY IT'S — SAY IT SHOULD STAY OUT. WE HAVE THE TRANSCRIPTS 
IF YOU WANT TO READ THEM SO YOU CAN SEE HOW IT ALL FITS 
TOGETHER. 
THE COURT: IF THERE'S A SERIOUS ISSUE CONCERNING 
WHETHER THERE — THE GUN IS HIS OR NOT HIS, THEN IT SEEMS TO 
ME THAT THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THIS IS FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT. I 
AGREE WITH MR. HUTCHISON'S ANALYSIS, THAT'S A MORE DEVASTATING 
PART OF THAT WHEN YOU THINK BACK TO THE NATURE OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. ALLEN AND THE — AND THE DEFENDANT. 
I WOULD THEREFORE INSTRUCT AND GRANT THE MOTION IN LIMINE AT 
LEAST TO THIS EXTENT: THAT THE STATE CAN TALK ABOUT THE FACT 
THAT THEY ARE ACQUAINTED, THEY'VE HAD ASSOCIATIONS IN THE 
PAST, AND THAT THE DEFENDANT MIGHT HAVE REASON TO BE ANGRY AT 
KIM ALLEN. THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME ACRIMONY IF INDEED THAT'S 
THE CASE. AND I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT'S THE CASE OR NOT. 
BUT THAT THEY ARE NOT TO REFERENCE THE FACT THAT THE 
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RELATIONSHIP AROSE OUT OF A PAROLE OFFICER-PAROLEE 
RELATIONSHIP. 
MR. HUTCHISON: ALL RIGHT. AND I — AND HE'LL HAVE 
TO — I SUPPOSE HE'LL HAVE TO PUT ON SOME EVIDENCE OF SOME 
SORT OF ANIMOSITY, TOO. THAT I DON'T THINK HE'S GOT THAT. 
HE'S NOT ON PAROLE. AND THEY NEVER HAD ANY TROUBLE. 
MR. HEWARD: AS I INDICATED — 
THE COURT: I SAID IF INDEED THERE IS THAT EVIDENCE 
AVAILABLE. BUT THEY'RE ENTITLED OBVIOUSLY TO — 
MR. HUTCHISON: BUT HE'LL BE JUST — BUT IF IT COMES IN 
AT ALL, IS WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, HE'LL JUST BE AN INDIVIDUAL 
MORRISON KNOWS. HE WON'T BE A FORMER SUPERVISING PAROLE 
OFFICER. 
THE COURT: THAT'S THE POINT. 
MR. HUTCHISON: OKAY. 
MR. HEWARD: AND I SUPPOSE THE POINT MAY BE MOOT, 
ANYWAY. 
MR. HUTCHISON: IF HE TAKES THE STAND. 
MR. HEWARD: IF HE TAKES THE STAND OR IF THE CASE IS 
TRIED TO HIS HONOR. 
MR. HUTCHISON: YEAH. I SUPPOSE IT WOULD AT THAT POINT 
IN TIME, BUT WE'RE STILL KEEPING THE OPTION OPEN IN CASE THE 
CASE GOES JURY. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. OKAY. 
MR. HUTCHISON: THAT YOU. ARE YOU MAKING A FINDING YOU 
401 
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CAN READ K. ALLEN ON THAT? DO YOU THINK YOU CAN? 
THE COURT: WELL, WE'LL ALLOW THE JURY TO MAKE THE 
DETERMINATION IF THAT'S WHAT IT SAYS. 
MR. HUTCHISON: I THINK IT'S A FACTUAL QUESTION. 
THE COURT: I THINK IT'S A FACTUAL QUESTION. 
MR. HUTCHISON: ALL RIGHT. OKAY. 
***** 
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THE COURT: Good morning. 
JURORS: Good morning. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. HEWARD: We are. State would 
recall Kim Allen, Your Honor. Do you want him 
resworn, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: No. 
KIM ALLEN, 
being previously sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HEWARD: 
Q. Mr. Allen, you are still under oath. You realize 
that? 
A. I realize that. 
Q. All right. A couple of things that I didn't ask 
you yesterday. Specifically, have you in your job, 
your experience, do you deal regularly with meth 
users and sellers? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And is it common for you to see people who are 
using and selling meth to become extremely paranoid? 
A. Yes, that's one of the characteristics. It's one 
of the problems with meth. 
Q. All right. Based upon that, when you found out 
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1 that there was a bullet recovered with your name on 
2 it in a search warrant of Mr, Morrison's home, did 
3 that cause you concern? 
4 A. Yes, it did. 
5 Q. Did you stop and think about anything that could 
6 have occurred in the time period immediately prior to 
7 this that could have caused him — 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. — to be upset at you? 
10 A. Yes, I did. 
11 Q. What would that have been? 
12 A. Probably, oh, maybe a month prior to Mike's 
13 arrest, I#d been working late and was notified over 
14 the radio that the Strike Force needed some 
15 assistance on a search at Mike Morrison's house and 
16 was wondering if I knew where he lived and if I'd 
17 been there. I told them, yeah, I knew the family 
18 well. So I assisted Mike Ashment and a couple of 
19 deputies from Davis County. We went to Mike's home, 
20 recovered some stolen property, stolen snow blowers 
21 from his place, and then Mike took us over to another 
22 place and got another stolen snow blower. So I 
23 figured maybe that got him upset at me. 
24 MR. HUTCHISON: I'd like the jury 
25 excused. I'd like to have a bench conference, side 
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1 bar with you. 
2 THE COURT: Would you mind stepping 
3 out, please? 
4 (WHEREUPON, at this time the jury leaves the 
5 courtroom, after which proceedings resume as 
6 follows:) 
7 MR. HUTCHISON: Moving for a 
8 mistrial. That is so prejudicial you can't believe 
9 it. There is absolutely no determination of fact 
10 that any snow blowers were stolen. There's been no 
11 litigation on that issue. It's another crime that's 
12 not charged which is put before the jury. It's a 
13 clear basis for a mistrial. 
14 MR. HEWARD: Specifically, it goes 
15 to his motive, Your Honor, as to whether or not he 
16 would be the person who had a bullet with Mr. Allen's 
17 name on it. That's why I couched my questions 
18 directly in the way that I did and limited it to not 
19 a time period which I asked Mr. Allen to go through 
20 his — his experience with Mr. Morrison and dealing 
21 with him over a period of time as a probation officer 
22 or parole officer. I stayed completely away from it. 
23 It's specifically to motive and, again, to tie this 
24 defendant to the bullet. 
25 MR. HUTCHISON: We've got a 
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1 situation, number one, where you've granted a motion 
2 in limine which now means nothing. I mean, 
3 absolutely means nothing, your order of limine 
4 because your original order was that the testimony 
5 could come in that Kim Allen knew the defendant, and 
6 that was the extent of it. And that is what you 
7 ordered on the motion in limine. 
8 That is completely destroyed now. Now we have 
9 evidence of a crime that he's never been convicted 
10 of, with a suggestion from Allen that he committed it 
11 and the property was received there, which is so 
12 clearly prejudicial that I'm entitled to a mistrial. 
13 MR. HEWARD: We would disagree, Your 
14 Honor. 
15 THE COURT: I don't think you're 
16 entitled to respond at this point. 
17 MR. HEWARD: Okay. 
18 THE COURT: I think — I think that 
19 the testimony has limited relevance relating to 
20 motive to put a name on a bullet that was found in a 
21 gun which may tie him to the gun. 
22 MR. HEWARD: Which is a hotly 
23 contested issue. 
24 THE COURT: Well, let me finish, 
25 please. 
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1 The concern I have is that the statement 
2 relating to the snow blowers is extraneous and highly 
3 prejudicial. It has nothing to do with this case 
4 and — and it has no relevance to the issues here, 
5 And, therefore, to go — to have gone beyond the fact 
6 that he was there on a search warrant doesn't really 
7 add anything and really is prejudicial. I — I'm not 
8 sure that it reaches prejudice to the level of 
9 granting a mistrial. 
10 MR. HUTCHISON: It's an allegation 
11 of — 
12 THE COURT: Now, wait just a second. 
13 What I would intend on doing is to instruct the jury 
14 that they're — that the theft of a snow blower is — 
15 he apparently hasn't been charged with that? 
16 MR. HUTCHISON: Hasn't been 
17 convicted. 
18 MR. MORRISON: They dismissed the 
19 charges. 
20 MR. HEWARD: It's a Davis County 
21 case, and the defendant's going to testify. He can 
22 clearly say those charges were dismissed. 
23 MR. HUTCHISON: You know, we're 
24 not — we're not supposed to be in a situation where 
25 we have to defend other charges. 
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THE COURT: He doesn't have to 
explain anything. 
MR. HEWARD: I know he doesn't have 
to, Your Honor. I wasn't suggesting that he had to. 
THE COURT: Well, but the concern I 
have is that there has been prejudice by reason of 
this. I'm not sure that it would be — that it would 
reach the level of granting a mistrial, and I'll 
attempt to resolve the issue by instructing the jury 
that. 
MR. HUTCHISON: Now? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HUTCHISON: Okay. I want it now 
so it's clear. I'm not withdrawing my motion for a 
mistrial, but I certainly want any curative things 
done now. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I'll attempt to 
cure the problem by explaining to them that --
MR. HUTCHISON: It's an unproven 
allegation that has nothing to do with this case. 
THE COURT: In fact, if — how do 
you feel about my instructing the jury that there 
were charges filed against him on that, but were 
dismissed, and that that has no relevance to this 
proceeding and to disregard that statement? 
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MR. HUTCHISON: Well, I don't — I'd 
love that except I don't — to be candid with the 
Court — and I'll try to be candid with the Court — 
I don't think anything has happened on it. I don't 
think they have been formally dismissed. They are 
just sitting there. 
MR. HEWARD: That's not true. 
MR. HUTCHISON: They have been 
dismissed? 
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checked with the 
ay before yesterday 
Well, I didn't know 
find out what the 
Well, then yeah, I 
I'm not withdrawing my earlier 
COURT: I understand. 
HUTCHISON: 
be devastating. 
Because I consider 
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1 THE COURT: All right. The Court — 
2 the Court will attempt to remedy what I consider to 
3 be prejudicial. 
4 MR. HUTCHISON: All right. Thank 
5 you, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Let's bring the jury 
7 back. 
8 (WHEREUPON, at this time the jury returns to 
9 the courtroom, after which proceedings resume as 
10 follows:) 
11 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of 
12 the jury, quite frequently during the course of a 
13 trial, things will come up unexpectedly which really 
14 shouldn't come to your attention. There has been 
15 some testimony that — that the defendant in this 
16 case was involved with some stolen snow blowers. 
17 Now, that hasn't got anything at all to do 
18 with this case and I'm instructing you specifically 
19 that you're to completely disregard it. And just to 
20 kind of back up and fortify the importance of not 
21 considering it, the Court's instructing you that 
22 charges were filed and dismissed. 
23 So that's not something that, in fairness, you 
24 ought to consider when you're determining the guilt 
25 or innocence of the defendant in this case. 
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ADDENDUM D 
1 Q. Yes. 
2 A. All I saw was the ammunition. I did not see 
3 other weapons. 
4 Q. Did yourself or Officer Swanson attempt to 
5 retrieve or retrieve what Ms. Teeter had placed at 
6 some other location upon your initially entering the 
7 room? 
8 A. Officer Swanson did. 
9 Q. Where was that placed by her? 
10 A. It was placed in a dresser that was on the south 
11 side of the bed. 
12 Q. And what side of the bed was the defendant on? 
13 A. He was on the south side when we came in. She 
14 crawled over him to get to the dresser. 
15 Q. Did you ever interview or specifically 
16 interrogate the defendant? 
17 A . I started talking to him very briefly upstairs. 
18 Q. Was that in Ms. Teeter's presence? 
19 A. Yes, it was. 
20 Q. And did he initially indicate a willingness to 
21 talk to you? 
22 A . I got the indication that he was willing to talk 
23 to me. 
24 Q. And did Ms. Teeter do or say something that 
25 stopped him? 
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A. She told him to shut up. 
Q. Did he do that? 
A. He did. 
Q. Did she tell him once or more than once? 
A. It was twice that she told him to shut up. 
Q. Were you aware of any narcotics in the room? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. What were you aware of? 
A. When officer — or Detective Swanson went to the 
drawer, he found a syringe, and I think there was a 
baggie of some powder that we suspected to be 
methamphetamine. 
Q. In your presence, did the defendant ever disclaim 
knowledge or ownership of that? 
A. I think initially — 
MR. HUTCHISON: Wait a minute. I'm 
going to impose an objection here. First of all, 
once he has started to remain silent then we need to 
have some foundation here. He's not — the fact of 
disclaiming -- or the lack of disclaimer is not a 
proper evidentiary question. 
MR. HEWARD: I'm not sure that it's 
not proper evidentiary, and I anticipate laying a 
foundation as far as the defendant's — 
MR. HUTCHISON: You need to lay it 
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with the officer who 
HEWARD: 
's coming up 
following this officer. 
MR. 
ask a question about 
without setting the 
preliminary things, 
HUTCHISON: 
arrest and Miranda 
immediately 
But you just can't 
disclaimer out of the blue 
foundation. 
first of all, 
He's done 
when he's obviously 
made an election, either directly or indirectly, to 
remain silent. 
THE 
Q. (By Mr. Heward) 
COURT: Sustained. 
Had — when you talk about the 
defendant -- I'll back up a little. When you talk 
about the defendant initially, you believe, being 
willing to talk to you upstairs and then Ms. Teeter 
telling him to shut up and him doing that, did the — 
was that done prior to or after you were downstairs 
in the room? 
A. That was after we'd been downstairs. 
Q. All right. So any discussion you would have had 
or any opportunity the defendant would have had to 
disclaim what you believed to be narcotics found in 
the room was done before he went upstairs and at Ms. 
Teeter's request remained silent? 
A. Correct. 
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Yes, he had. 
And had you continued on, apparen* 
ng drugs? 
Yes. 
But he had been out of commission 
that correct? 
Yes. That's true. 
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So the answer is? 
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(Nods head up 
Yes? 
Uh huh. 
this is his personal papers 
and down.) 
Okay. That is the same drawer that the gun was 
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